In this paper we examine ethical issues relevant to conducting mental health research with refugees and immigrant communities that have cultural orientations and social organisation that are substantially different to those of the broader Australian community, and we relate these issues to NH&MRC Guidelines. We describe the development and conduct of a mental health research project carried out recently in Melbourne with the Somali community, focusing on ethical principles involved, and relating these to the NH&MRC National Statement on Ethical Conduct (...) in Research Involving Humans, and the NH&MRC document Values and Ethics: Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research.The experience of conducting mental health research with the Somali community highlights the fact that the principles of inclusion and benefit enunciated in the NH&MRC document Values and Ethics are particularly pertinent when conducting research with refugees and immigrant communities that are culturally distant to those of the broader Australian community. These principles inform issues of research design and consent, as well as guiding respectful engagement with the participating community and communication of the research findings. (shrink)

En reseña de: PeñaFreire, Antonio Manuel.Legalidad y orden jurídico. El debate sobre la legalidad del exterminio nazi, Atelier, Barcelona, 2018.Esta reseña examina la última obra del profesor Antonio M. Peña Freire, Legalidad y orden jurídico. El debate sobre la legalidad del exterminio nazi, Atelier, Barcelona, 2018. En ella se exponen sus tesis fundamentales, se formulan breves observaciones críticas, se da noticia de la presentación del libro que tuvo lugar en Granada recientemente y se invita a su lectura sobre la base (...) de un juicio positivo de la obra. (shrink)

O artigo retoma a questão da ordem de leitura dos diálogos de Platão, já explorada na Antiguidade, e discute criticamente a posição do desenvolvimentismo, segundo a qual Platão teria abandonado suas doutrinas do período intermediário. Além disso, ele apresenta sete princípios a partir dos quais se pode criar um ordem ao mesmo tempo dramática e pedagógica para os diálogos.

Adverbial modification is probably one of the least understood areas of linguistics. The essays in this volume all address the problem of how to give an analysis of adverbial modifiers within truth-conditional semantics. Chapters I-VI provide analyses of particular modifiers within a possible worlds framework, and were written between 1974 and 1981. Original publication details of these chapters may be found on p. vi. Of these, all but Chapter I make essential use of the idea that the time reference involved (...) in tensed sentences should be a time interval rather than a single instant. The final chapter (Chapter VII) was written especially for this volume and investigates the question of how the 'situation semantics' recently devised by Jon Barwise and John Perry, as a rival to possible-worlds semantics, might deal with adverbs. In addition I have included an appendix to Chapter III and an introduction which links all the chapters together. (shrink)

The most common way of proving decidability in propositional modal logic is to shew that the system in question has the finite model property. This is not however the only way. Gabbay in [4] proves the decidability of many modal systems using Rabin's result in [8] on the decidability of the second-order theory of successor functions. In particular [4, pp. 258-265] he is able to prove the decidability of a system which lacks the finite model property. Gabbay's system is however (...) complete, in the sense of being characterized by a class of frames, and the question arises whether there is a decidable modal logic which is not complete. Since no incomplete modal logic has the finite model property [9, p. 33], any proof of decidability must employ some such method as Gabbay's. In this paper I use the Gabbay/Rabin technique to prove the decidability of a finitely axiomatized normal modal propositional logic which is not characterized by any class of frames. I am grateful to the referee for suggesting improvements in substance and presentation.The terminology I am using is standard in modal logic. By aframeis understood a pair 〈W, R〉 in whichWis a class (of “possible worlds”) andR⊆W2. To avoid confusion in what follows, a frame will henceforth be referred to as aKripkeframe. By contrast, ageneral frameis a pair 〈,Π〉 in whichis a Kripke frame andΠis a collection of subsets ofWclosed under the Boolean operations and satisfying the condition that ifAis inΠthen so isR−1“A. A model on a frame (of either kind) is obtained by adding a functionVwhich assigns sets of worlds to propositional variables. In the case of a general frame we require thatV(p) ∈Π. (shrink)

The second of these lines seems to be the result of an interpolation designed to spell out the implicit sense of the first. In 241–6 Ion has expressed amazement that Creusa should be weeping at the sight of Apollo's sanctuary, a sight which brings other visitors joy. She prefaces her explanation of this with an assurance which in its transmitted form is elegantly translated by Grégoire: ‘Il n'est point discourtois de ta part, étranger, de marquer ta surprise au sujet de (...) mes pleurs.’ But there are reasons for doubting I the authenticity of line 248: Line 247 is self-sufficient, as is shown by IA 1402: τ μν σόν, νενι, γενναίως χει. This also gives the closest parallel for the use of τ σόν in reference to the attitude which a previous speaker's words have just expressed. Other instances of τ σόν, tout court, are helpfully grouped in Allen and Italie's Concordance to Euripides, s.v. σός. τ σόν…[adverbial phrase] χει occurs also in Hek. 1195 and Med. 312; cf. HF 165, Hel. 893, Pho. 995 with τομόν. These make it unlikely that τ χόν in our passage is to be taken adverbially, as perhaps Grégoire intended with ‘de ta part’, rather than as subject of χει. Tro. 82 might be adduced for the alternative , but there is no reason for Creusa to be saying emphatically ‘as far as you are concerned’. (shrink)

This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...) readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic. (shrink)

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Watts Miller’s book on Durkheim joins a growing number of recent reassessments of Durkheim’s significance as a radical thinker rather than the naïvely positivistic sociologist he is sometimes taken for. The newer interpretations suggest that he can be read as a late-modern or even a postmodern thinker who imaginatively combined social science with a political and ethical vision. Watts Miller argues that Durkheim should be read as making a key contribution to liberal socialist ethics, to a “communitarian defence of individualism” (...) within a significant continuation of the “enlightenment project.” The perspective followed is to separate Durkheim from Comte and the Comtean tradition, and to read Durkheim on ethics as engaged principally in a debate with Kant. Watts Miller argues that Durkheim is concerned with the “rational deliberation of ends,” and “not only to identify, clarify and rework ideals, but also to adjudicate on them”. Watts Miller proposes to look again at the fundamental problem of any engaged social science—how to argue both for individual autonomy of thought and action and for a science which adjudicates and legislates social values. In Watts Miller’s view, it is Durkheim who brings this off. (shrink)

In his treatment of the One and the Many in the Science of Logic, is Hegel talking about atoms? He is and is not. He discusses critically the atoms and the void of the ancients as part of his own presentation of a being-for-self One from which the Many purportedly derive. The void of the ancients is seen by Hegel as the ground of movement, but not in the representational sense as affording "room," in which case it would be a (...) presupposition, not a ground. The void is properly conceived as the ground of movement not sensuously or pictorially, says Hegel, but "only as the negative relation of the One to its negative, to the One, i.e., to its own self, which nevertheless is posited as a determinate being." With such an ontological One that in its own being is immanently related to its other, Bloch seeks to show, thinking is freed once and for all from traditional atomism’s pregiven particulate corpuscles fortuitously combining and separating in a pregiven space and time. Hegel’s One is at the same time a plurality of ones, ideal atoms immanently related in their being and requiring no extraneous "forces" to set them in motion or in process with one another. Modern theoretical physics, which concedes the inadequacy of sensuous and intuitive thinking, would do well to note Hegel’s criticisms of historical atomisms and to re-examine the possibilities in Hegel’s Atomistik for new ways of conceiving physical reality. (shrink)